BOOK REVIEWS
Collective Bargaining: Negotiations and Agreements. By Selwyn H. Torff.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953. Pp. ix, 323. $5.50.
Any book on the subject of collective bargaining must be appraised in
terms of what it seeks to convey, why, and to whom.
Mr. Torff states that his purpose is "to describe and analyze in both an
objective and a constructive manner the process of collective bargaining as
it functions in the United States today." His method "is to set forth the
issues which commonly arise in the course of collective bargaining; to expound
and analyze the positions, contentions, and viewpoints of employers and
labor unions on these issues; and to explain the various ways in which these
issues are resolved. No attempt is made to 'sell' the reader on the merit or
lack of merit of any such contention, viewpoint or solution to a problem."
As to the "why" and "whom," Mr. Torff states: "This volume is intended
to be neither a management polemic nor an expanded version of a union
handbill. It is intended to give the uninitiated layman or student an uncolored version of the subject matter and workings of the American collective
bargaining process; at the same time, it may prove of some value to the
representatives of employers and employees engaged in the collective bargaining process by facilitating a better understanding than has heretofore prevailed of the nature of the respective contentions and issues raised by each.
The volume is divided into four parts: "Collective Bargaining Negotiations
and Agreements-Introduction"; "The Negotiation of 'Non-Economic' Issues"; "The Negotiation of 'Economic' Issues"; and "Administration and
Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements."
The subject matter conforms literally to the title. Within the area indicated, there is very little of substance that has been omitted except a discussion of the function of mediation and conciliation. It is regrettable that
Mr. Torff gives only passing mention to this subject, since mediation and
conciliation are important techniques for making collective bargaining "a
more efficacious instrumentality of public policy," an end which Mr. Torff
stresses. This omission may be forgiven, however, in view of the net contribution which the author has made to the literature in this field.
Mr. Torff has warned the reader that he is dealing with things as they
are, rather than as they should or will be. There have been, quite naturally,
some developments in the law and practice of labor relations since he completed his work, particularly those resulting from recent decisions of the
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National Labor Relations Board. Aside from those decisions, at least one
development worthy of mention has occurred, namely, the evolution of voluntary arbitration machinery to settle organizational or jurisdictional disputes
within and between the AFL and CIO, portending the removal of a major
source of friction in industrial relations. The full impact of this development
cannot yet be appraised.
What impresses me most about this book is its comprehensiveness, its detail and, with notably few exceptions, its objectivity. I should have guessed
that an undertaking of this sort would have required at least two volumes
of the same size. There is no issue, broadly speaking, arising in collective
bargaining which Mr. Torff has failed to cover with sufficient detail so that
the nature of the issue, the problems involved, and the positions of labor and
management may be understood. This success is explained by an unusual
ability to go to the heart of the matter involved and to state the proposition
concisely and clearly. This ability in turn results from a thorough mastery of
the subject matter plus a knack of communication which the most expert
teacher could only envy.
To illustrate, Chapter 11 treats the subject "Hours of Work and Overtime" in nineteen pages (pp. 149-68). Mr. Torff begins by pointing out the
relation between collective bargaining and the Fair Labor Standards Act in
this area. He then discusses the distinction between "overtime" pay and
"premium" pay; types of overtime pay (weekly overtime, daily overtime,
Saturday and Sunday overtime, sixth- and seventh-day overtime, holiday
overtime, overtime for work outside scheduled hours); time not worked as
"hours worked"; and miscellaneous problems (definitions of "work week"
and "workday," prevention of work guarantee, anti-pyramiding clauses, distribution of overtime, whether overtime work is optional or obligatory). The
discussion embraces problems known by negotiators, mediators and arbitrators to be complex and difficult. To a large extent, perhaps, these problems
have been met. More current problems are covered with the same thoroughness in Chapter 16--"Employee Benefit Plans" (pp. 237-71)-and in other
chapters.
Taking as an example the author's discussion of hours of work and overtime, who would be benefited by the presentation, and how? First, an employer and a union negotiating their first contract, without expert advice,
would be warned of trouble spots which they should seek to anticipate by way
of an oral understanding, or by appropriate contract language, which in
many cases is suggested by the text. Must the employee work overtime if so
assigned, subject to discipline if he refuses? If overtime is available, must the
employer distribute it equally, and, if so, among whom, under what conditions, and subject to what penalty if he fails in his obligation?
Second, the expert adviser, lawyer or otherwise, would benefit by a rapid
review of the problems which should be covered by appropriate language;
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if a dispute should arise on a particular issue during negotiations or arbitration, he is provided with a thumbnail sketch of the arguments typically advanced by one side or the other in support of its position. He may need to
go further, of course-and this is one respect in which Mr. Torff might
properly have inserted a caveat-and, for example, examine the past practice
of the parties where the contract language is not clear.
Third, the arbitrator, when called on to interpret an agreement, or, in the
rare case, to decide what should go into an agreement, would benefit by the
perspective gained through Mr. Torff's discussion of the particular issue.
Fourth, the student in labor economics or labor law--perhaps even the
teacher-would benefit by an understanding of the complexities which lie
beneath a simple textbook statement such as the following: "One of the
subjects of collective bargaining negotiations is the matter of hours of work
and overtime. Period."
In a seminar for advanced students, of course, or for the expert with his
own checklist, Mr. Torff's analysis would be only the taking-off point for a
search in the labor services (BNA, CCH, P-H, etc.) for cases dealing with
variations on the theme. This facet of the topic is indicated by the caveat
mentioned above. For example, assume that a collective bargaining agreement contains a standard "management rights" clause (treated in Chapter 9,
pp. 125-31), and a seniority clause (Chapter 8, pp. 102-25) which limits
seniority rights of all kinds (layoff, recall, promotions, shift preference, etc.)
to employees engaged in a specified occupation within a department. When
the agreement was first negotiated, eight years ago, all traffic services (trucking, etc.) were provided by employees in Department 18. As time went on,
supervisors in Departments 1, 3 and 5, at various times, went to the union
officials and asked for "permission," in writing, to assign a lift truck to the
particular department, to be used intermittently by skilled machinists, etc.,
in moving their tools from one work place to another. In 1954, a layoff occurred in Department 18, while lift trucks were still being operated in Departments 1, 3 and 5, with sufficient regularity that all such work combined
would provide a full-time job for a laid-off man. On investigation, the union
discovered that supervisors in Departments 9, 11 and 13, without "permission," had obtained and were using lift trucks in the same manner as
Departments 1, 3 and 5; that Department 23 was using a man, classified
as a janitor, exclusively as a lift-truck operator; that Department 25 was
using a janitor seventy per cent of the time as a lift-truck operator; and that
Department 27 was using a stock clerk thirty per cent of his time as a lifttruck operator. Further, past practice showed that whenever work previously
performed by a particular department was partially assigned to another department, management and the union agreed that the departments would be
combined, as to such work, for the purposes of layoff and recall but for no
other seniority purposes.
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In this situation (an actual unreported case) the union asks that all traffic
work be restored to Department 18, and that the laid-off men be recalled and
be given back pay. Management points to the "management rights" clause,
to the provision limiting seniority rights to an occupation within a department,
to the "permission" received from the union in Departments 1, 3 and 5, and
to the increased efficiency resulting from the new practice. The union replies
that by seeking permission in the first instance, the management had conceded that assignment of traffic work outside Department 18 was otherwise
not permissible under the agreement; that the past practice of combining
other departments for purposes of seniority should control as evidence of
contractual intent; and that the limitation of seniority rights to layoff and
recall when departments were combined was a voluntary concession by the
union in the particular cases, which it need not extend to the cases in dispute. How should the dispute be (a) settled, or (b) decided by an arbitrator?
For various reasons, I wish Mr. Torff had included such an example. First,
it would remove the inference, which might be drawn from his orderly and
precise treatment, that the problems discussed arise in orderly and precise
contexts. Second, it would stress the importance of factors beyond the contract language, e.g., past practice, which might be important to some arbitrators in determining the meaning and application of contract language.
Third, it would test the adequacy of the flat statement (p. 126)-one of the
very few wherein Mr. Torff departs from his meticulous neutrality-that "all
the rights of management which are not qualified or abrogated by the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement continue to reside in the employer."
Fourth, it would raise the question as to where the line is to be drawn between rewriting and interpreting or applying an agreement (see p. 317).
Finally, such a case would test Mr. Torff's position (pp. 303, 317) that
"acceptability to the disputants is no test for an arbitrator to use in deciding
a case arising under an agreement limiting his functions to interpreting and
applying the terms thereof."' Mr. Torff here departs from his usual approach
-"Some people feel this way, others the opposite way, for these reasons by his stern admonition against regarding arbitration as anything but a
"judicial" process. He overlooks his own well-stated proposition that "labor
arbitration serves the public interest by affording a peaceable alternative to
the strike and lockout tactics which might be resorted to in an effort to
force the settlement of grievances" (p. 315). In that sense, it is at least arguable that a "good" arbitration award, like a "good" strike settlement, should
be one which is mutually acceptable. Even more important, private voluntary
arbitration should be conducted as the parties to the contract desire. If they
wish their arbitrator to combine mediation and decision-making, they are
entitled to that procedure. If they wish their arbitrator to "just decide, and
'For the opposite view, see Simkin, Acceptability as a Factor in Arbitration under
an Existing Agreement, reviewed in 5 Stanford L. Rev. 863 (1953).
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let the chips fall where they may," they are so entitled. The important thing
is to have the arbitrator's course charted in advance. Most arbitrators can
and do accommodate themselves to either approach. Curiously enough, among
those who insist that the arbitrator must take a "judicial" attitude, there are
a number whose concept of "judicial" is fulfilled by scrutinizing the prior
awards of a prospective arbitrator to calculate his "batting average," i.e., to
see what proportion of his awards have gone to management or labor, rather
than to examine the logic or fairness of his reasoning in dealing with particular cases. I do not for a moment suggest that Mr. Torff is included in that
number. There is no trace of duplicity in his book.
There are other points, mostly minor, where Mr. Torff's statements may be
questioned. For example, in stating the arguments on the question of a "permanent umpire system" versus an "ad hoc" method, he lists, as one of the
objections to the former, the argument that the parties may "find themselves saddled with an arbitrator of permanent tenure in whom they have
lost confidence." This argument overlooks the common practice of inserting
in the "permanent" umpire's contract a provision permitting termination of
the appointment at the option of either or both parties. If one party makes
the choice, that party "buys up" the contract; if both concur, they share the
cost.
Mr. Torff deplores, with some justification, the tendency of government to
intervene in labor disputes, thereby discouraging collective bargaining. He
fails, however, to stress the fact that in a period of war or near-war, as in the
Korean crisis, a choice has to be made between the demands of national security and the values of free collective bargaining. The real problem is to
determine the point at which national security requires intervention, the kind
and degree of controls needed at the moment, and the earliest point at which
controls may be relaxed or removed. There is no justification for the criticand again this does not apply to Mr. Torff-who is outraged because the
government does not have enough steel bullets to supply our forces in Korea
and at the same time is concerned because the government is intervening to
prevent or settle a strike in an industry which supplies the steel to make
those bullets.
In this connection, Mr. Torff adopts, rather mechanically, the charge that
the Wage Stabilization Board departed from the established government
policy of "neutrality" on the issue of "union security," by its recommendations in the 1952 steel case. To begin with, the implication that the Board
attempted to foist a union shop on an open-shop industry is misleading.
Union security clauses take various forms, including the closed shop, under
which only union members may be hired; the full union shop, under which
all must join within a prescribed period, and all must remain members; the
modified union shop, under which prior non-member employees need not
join, but all others must become or remain members, perhaps with an oppor-
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tunity to "escape" at stated intervals; and maintenance of membership, under
which no employees need join, but any who do must remain members, with
an opportunity to "escape" at stated intervals. To the advocates of the
"right to work" concept, all variants are objectionable, since all involve
"compulsory unionism."
Beginning in 1944 the form of union security common to the steel industry
was maintenance of membership. A few steel companies had union-shop
agreements with the Steelworkers, and some had union- or closed-shop agreements with other unions. Under any of these forms of union security, if a
member were expelled from the union for any reason, he risked loss of his
job. In 1947, Congress limited this risk to failure to tender dues and initiation
fees, and further safeguards were enacted against arbitrary union action. This
made the union shop more palatable, so that, by 1952, the trend was toward
some form of union shop broader than maintenance of membership.
This background is important in weighing Mr. Torff's statement-that the
Wage Stabilization Board, in recommending a union shop, had departed
from the government's traditional policy of "neutrality" on the issue of union
security. The statement is clearly erroneous. First, the War Labor Board
had commonly directed maintenance of membership, which is, as previously
explained, a form of union shop. Maintenance of membership in the steel
industry resulted from such a directive. Second, the War Labor Board directed a union-shop and even a closed-shop clause, if contained in a previous
agreement, despite the employer's unwillingness to renew the clause. This
situation is perhaps distinguishable, but Mr. Torff's statement is made without qualification. Third, on the eve of the Wage Stabilization Board's recommendation in the steel case, a special government fact-finding board appointed
to consider a dispute over "union security" in the railroad industry, recommended a union shop, although there had been no form of union security in
that industry previously. Therefore, the Wage Stabilization Board acted with
ample precedent. Mr. Torff's description of the present status of union security in the steel industry as a "greatly watered down" union shop, even if
accurate, is beside the point. The Board's recommendation did not urge any
particular form of union shop; it allowed the maximum of freedom in bargaining in that regard. The recommendation got the parties off dead center. They
bargained, and came up with an agreement which settled the controversy.
And, judging by outward appearances, labor relations in the steel industry
since have been more stable than ever before.
I happen to believe that labor-management relations, in terms of mutual
understanding and respect, are perhaps in a healthier state than at any time
in our history. Mr. Torff evidently does not agree. I regret that he did not,
perhaps in a separate part of his book, give us his appraisal of the entire collective bargaining process, with some suggestions for improvement, to allevi-
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ate what he describes as "the suspicion and hostility that currently characterize and permeate American labor relations" (p. 4). Where he has undertaken
such an appraisal in a particular phase ("Evaluation of the Grievance Procedure," pp. 300-302), he has shown understanding and courage. Despite this
omission, his contribution is most constructive and helpful, even, or perhaps
especially, to us lawyers, despite no more than a few scattered footnotes. As
a labor-law teacher and arbitrator, I am happy to have this book in my
library.
NATHAN P. FEINSINGER*
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.

The Psychology of the Criminal Act and Punishment. By Gregory Zilboorg,
M.D. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954. Pp. 141. $3.50.
This book on the psychology of criminal acts and punishment proceeds
from a simple psychological premise: society's reaction to crime is explained
by a fundamental conflict, "the eternal struggle between the striving to
punish and the yearning to understand and forgive."' But the whole complex of facts concerning crime and punishment, psychiatry and law, cannot
be explained or understood on the basis of an "eternal" psychological struggle.
This view is romantic, not scientific. Neither contemporary research, nor
general history, nor the history of law, nor the history of psychiatry afford
any proof of it. The progress of criminal law has certainly not taken place
on any such subjective basis. In this book the broad, concrete social and economic historical forces are suppressed-or perhaps repressed. Divisions within society either do not exist or are explained by divisions "within one and
the same person."'2 The purely subjective approach puts social problems in
a false focus.
The author contrasts two quotations from Mr. Justice Holmes. In the one
Holmes praises science; 3 in the other he refers to the necessity of punishment. 4 The author finds between the two quotations "not only a flagrant
contradiction, but a true confusion." 5 Holmes's stand, however, is very clear.
It is the author who is confused when he seeks solutions "in the inner psychology of the problem." He sees emotional problems where there are social
problems. Primarily legal decisions do not express individual emotions, though
these may enter incidentally. Fundamentally, legal decisions represent social
forces and interests. The whole overemphasis on psychology as the basic consideration is misleading, and serves to divert attention from the social environment in which all psychological forces operate. The author of this book
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2Pp. 4-5.
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